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Evaluating the Impact of Community
Penalties
GEORGE MAIR
For much of the twentieth century, many criminal justice policymakers and
criminologists have been obsessed with the search for viable alternatives to
custodial sentences. In England and Wales, finding alternatives to custody has
arguably been the single most important penal policy issue since the end of the
Second World War. Since Parliament passed the 1948 Criminal Justice Act,
penal policy been driven by the need to respond to increases in the prison
population that have led to serious problems of overcrowding and control.
Policymakers and criminologists have laboured to discover an alternative to
custody that actually works. But this search is fundamentally misconceived-a
point that is only rarely noted and even then, often ignored.
This is not to deny that the key question is whether community penalties
or intermediate punishments actually "work." Despite (or perhaps because of)
the many years of frenetic research during the 1970s and 1980s,' there are no
easy answers to this question. This Article revisits the issue of community
penalties and focuses on how best to evaluate them. It seems to me that this
is a question central to the Symposium.
This Article is organized into five parts. Section I discusses the work of
Robert Martinson, whose legacy, "nothing works,"2 unfortunately still domi-
nates much of the debate on the effectiveness of community sentences. Section
George Mair is the principal research officer for the Home Office Research & Planning
Unit in London, England.
1. Stephen Stanley and Mary Baginsky, Alternatives to Prison: An Examination of
Non-Custodial Sentencing of Offenders (Peter Owen, 1984); John Pointing, ed, Alternatives
to Custody (Basil Blackwell, 1986); Antony A. Vass, Alternatives to Prison: Punishment,
Custody and the Community (Sage, 1990); Helsinki Inst for Crime Prevention and Control,
Alternatives to Custodial Sanctions (1988); Josine Junger-Tas, Alternatives to Prison
Sentences: Experiences and Developments (Kugler, 1994); Norman Bishop, Non-Custodial
Alternatives in Europe (Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 1988). For a
worldwide perspective, see UgIjesa Zvekic, ed, Alternatives to Imprisonment in Comparative
Perspective (Nelson-Hall, 1994); Ugljesa Zvekic and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, eds, Alterna-
tives to Imprisonment in Comparative Perspective: Bibliography (Nelson-Hall, 1994).
2. Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform,
35 Pub Interest 22 (1974).
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II examines the relatively recent interest in meta-analysis and the "nothing
works" debate. Section III makes some general points relating to evaluation.
Section IV describes a recent major evaluative study of an Intensive Probation
(IP) initiative3 in England and Wales. Section V sets out general lessons from
the IP evaluation for the evaluation of community penalties in general.
It may be helpful to make three preliminary points. These points are only
loosely connected to the topic of this Article, but they constitute much of the
necessary background, and, to a considerable degree, they frame what follows.
First, my views are coloured by my position as principal research officer
of the Home Office Research and Planning Unit. The Unit conducts research
for the government and is indeed part of the state apparatus. My approach to
evaluation therefore focuses on the needs and priorities of policymakers.
Second, the idea of alternatives to prison is now officially dead in England and
Wales. There was always uneasiness about an idea implying prison was the
only appropriate sentence for a criminal to receive. The 1991 Criminal Justice
Act eradicated the idea of alternatives to custody by introducing a "just
desserts" approach to sentencing. Although this approach was somewhat
diluted by section 66 of the 1993 Criminal Justice Act, it remains official
policy. Third, since 1984 when the Statement of National Objectives and
Priorities4 was introduced, the probation service in England and Wales has
been in a state of almost constant flux. A service that must react to new-and
what tend to be seen as threatening-policy developments is unlikely to be at
its best. Indeed, change continues: new proposals were published in a Green
Paper in March 1995, s and they are likely to create further uneasiness about
the role of probation.
I. The "Nothing Works" Debate
Twenty-one years ago, Robert Martinson's article What Works? Questions
and Answers about Prison Reform appeared in the journal Public Interest'
and sparked a furious academic debate. Years after the term "nothing works"
was first coined, it remains a wonderful sound bite. But like so many sound
bites, it does not withstand close scrutiny.
It should not take more than a couple of minutes to realize that "nothing
works" is a meaningless formulation. No one would maintain that everything
works, and it is equally absurd to claim that "nothing works." At the very
least-and only partly frivolously-one can say that "nothing" has not been
3. For a discussion of the IP initiative, see George Mair, et al, Intensive Probation in
England and Wales: An Evaluation (HMSO, 1994).
4. Home Office, Probation Service in England and Wales: Statement of National
Objectives and Priorities (HMSO, 1984).
5. A Green Paper (so-called because of the color of the cover) is a government paper
setting forth options for legislation and calling for consultation by policymakers. See Home
Office, Strengthening Punishment in the Community (HMSO, 1995).
6. Martinson, 35 Pub Interest at 22 (cited in note 2).
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tried and that the "works" part of the idea bases the effectiveness of sentences
wholly on recidivism, a simplistic and problematic criterion. In fact, nowhere
in Martinson's article does he state that "nothing works." His own summary
of the evidence was certainly qualified: "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the
rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable
effect on recidivism."7 It is questionable whether this statement can be reduced
to the simple conclusion that "nothing works"; indeed it is worth noting that
the statement itself contains several ambiguous terms-"few and isolated,"
"reported," "so far," and, perhaps most important, "appreciable effect."
Further, given the evidence Martinson considers, his statement is too negative.
His article is littered with phrases such as "impossible to interpret,"8 "no clear
evidence," 9 "difficult to interpret,"' "ambiguous results,"" "suggestive,"' 2
"equivocal," 3 "problem in interpreting,"" and "important caveat." 5 In
these post-modern times when we are very aware that reading a text is not a
simple activity, and when we know about post-structuralist theories of litera-
ture and the deconstruction of texts, a reading of the article should take full
account of these cautionary noises and come to a suitably cautious conclusion.
For better or worse, Martinson's work was hijacked by the media. Ted
Palmer's work has suggested that it was a result of the interaction between
Martinson's article and the media that "nothing works" became an unequivo-
cal finding." But this is not an adequate reason to explain the rapid appro-
priation-or, more properly, misappropriation-of Martinson's work. Instead,
timing was crucial. As Francis Cullen and Karen Gilbert demonstrated,"7
Martinson (quite unintentionally) found a remarkably receptive audience on
both sides of the political spectrum: the Right saw Martinson's work as an at-
tack on the rehabilitative ideal that they believed was soft on offenders; the
Left saw Martinson's work as an attack on "treatment" they believed was
unjust, intrusive, and an abuse of power.'" In addition, the community's
penological agenda was shifting; the justice model, decriminalization, diversion,
and crime prevention were all growing in significance. Martinson's work could
only encourage these developments, and it therefore fell on very fertile ground.
Equally important was the seductive clarity of "nothing works"-a neat,
simple formula that cut through the caveats, equivocations, and convolutions
7. Id at 25.
8. Id at 28.
9. Id at 27.
10. Id at 45.
11. Id at 30.
12. Id at 31.
13. Id at 32-34.
14. Id at 41.
15. Id at 47.
16. Ted Palmer, Correctional Intervention and Research xix, 16-17 (Lexington, 1978).
17. Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation (Anderson,
1982).
18. Id at 111-12.
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of much social science research. 9 A top advertising agency would be hard-
pressed to come up with a phrase so attractive.
In addition to the fact that the conclusion that "nothing works" is not
borne out by the details of Martinson's original article, his argument itself is
fundamentally flawed in two ways. First, he relies on recidivism as the sole
criterion for judging the success of a sentence. Second, he fails to address the
issue of how sentences are implemented. These weaknesses are evident both in
Martinson's work and in the primary studies he relies upon.
Recidivism has played a central role in post-war criminology. But the usual
measurement of recidivism-reconviction rates-has been treated with far more
respect than it deserves. Too rarely is it recognized that reconviction rates are,
for the most part, artifacts constructed from rather dubious data. Indeed, there
is a real issue as to whether recidivism should be used as a measure of
effectiveness for all sentences. Certainly, a major objective of community
penalties is to reduce re-offending, but whether prisons or fines have this goal
as their main objective is debatable. Even if one accepts that reconviction rates
are an appropriate measure of effectiveness (and they may be more helpful as
performance indicators), they are by no means a simple measure; they have
various limitations that need to be fully understood before meaning is assigned
to them.
First, reconviction rates cannot measure retribution, reparation, general
deterrence, denunciation, or whether an offender has been diverted from
custody-all of which could be counted as objectives of the sentencing process
and, therefore, potential measures of success not captured by reconviction
rates. Second, reconviction rates can be defined in a variety of ways. Michael
Maltz, for example, identifies nine, each of which has more than one qualify-
ing condition."0 Third, reconviction is not re-offending: estimates from the
British Crime Survey (BCS) suggest that for every one hundred offenses com-
mitted, only two result in a criminal conviction.2 ' Fourth, it is unclear wheth-
er there is a "correct" follow-up period: twenty-four months tends to be the
norm,22 but some offenders are re-convicted quickly (e.g., car thieves), while
others may take five or more years for reconviction (e.g., sex offenders). 3
Fifth, it is difficult to decide when to begin counting reconvictions: in the case
of prison sentences, one normally begins counting at the time of release, but
19. Perhaps I should make clear that I do not believe that this is a result of social
scientists' congenital inability to be plain-spoken but rather a reflection of the caution that
must be shown in the face of complex realities that rarely have clear-cut solutions.
20. The nine factors are arrest, reconviction, incarceration, parole violation, parole
suspension, parole revocation, offense, absconding, and probation. Michael D. Maltz,
Recidivism 62 (Academic, 1984).
21. See Home Office, Digest 2: Information on the Criminal Justice System in England
and Wales 29 (HMSO, 1993).
22. Charles Lloyd, George Mair, and Mike Hough, Explaining Reconviction Rates: A
Critical Analysis 6 (HMSO, 1994).
23. Id.
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for community penalties (e.g., probation or community service orders), count-
ing begins on the date of sentencing.24 Sixth, there is a time lag between the
offense and the conviction. As a result, some offenders offend prior to their
"target" appearance but are re-convicted after they have begun their sentence
(false. positives), while toward the end of the follow-up period others will re-
offend but not be reconvicted until after the follow-up period has been com-
pleted (false negatives)Y Seventh, reconviction cannot simply be equated with
failure: if it were, the implication would be that all reconvictions are of equal
severity, which is patently not the case.2" Eighth, police and prosecution
practices have an impact on reconviction rates (by way of cautioning and
discontinuance) that is difficult to measure.27 And finally, interpreting recon-
viction rates is complex, (e.g., can all probation day centres be condemned for
a high national reconviction rate?).2"
Martinson's study also fails to account for how a programme's success is
influenced by the particular manner in which it is operated and organized.
This is not surprising, since the primary studies themselves generally fail to
address these issues. At most, researchers spend a paragraph or a page describ-
ing a programme; we are rarely given the full rationale for why it exists.
Researchers only occasionally study how programmes are planned, how they
are put into practice, and how and why they change over time. Yet these
matters are crucial to determining the success or failure of a project. For
example, if a large number of the projects Martinson considered were poorly
planned, badly implemented, starved of resources, or were administered by
untrained and uncommitted staff with a high turnover rate-would it be any
surprise to find the programmes had failed?
By concentrating on outcome, and solely on recidivism, Martinson offered
a very limited view of evaluation. For most of the last twenty years, however,
the debate on alternatives to custody has followed the same, repetitious path.
Opponents have taken the same studies investigated by Martinson, perhaps
added a few more, carried out their own review, and proclaimed that Martin-
son was wrong; Martinson's defenders have counter-attacked.29 Indeed, there
24. Id.
25. Id at 7.
26. Id at 8.
27. For example, an increase in police cautioning is likely to lead to offenses that
previously would have resulted in a conviction ending in a caution, which would depress
reconviction rates. Similarly, if prosecution discontinuance rates increase, reconviction rates
would be depressed.
28. Lloyd, Mair, and Hough, Explaining Reconviction Rates at 10 (cited in note 22).
29. See, for example, John T. Whitehead and Steven P. Lab, A Meta-Analysis of
Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 26 J Res Crime & Delinq 276 (1989); Don A. Andrews,
et al, Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically
Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 Criminology 369 (1990); Steven P. Lab and John T. White-
head, From "Nothing Works" to "Tbe Appropriate Works": The Latest Stop on the
Search for the Secular Grail, 28 Criminology 405 (1990); Don A. Andrews, A Human
Science Approach or More Punishment and Pessimism: A Rejoinder to Lab and White-
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has even been a debate about whether or not Martinson recanted (or more
appropriately, modified) his views before his death.30
II. Old Wine in New Bottles: Meta-Analysis
Recently, the participants in this debate discovered meta-analysis. One of
the key figures in the development of meta-analysis describes the differences
between primary, secondary, and meta-analysis as follows:
PRIMARY ANALYSIS is the original analysis of data in a research
study.. .. SECONDARY ANALYSIS is the re-analysis of data for the
purpose of answering the original research question with better statistical
techniques, or answering new questions with old data. . . . Meta-analysis
refers to the analysis of analyses. . . . [t]he statistical analysis of a large
collection of analysis results from individual studies for the purpose of
integrating the findings. It connotes a rigorous alternative to the casual,
narrative discussions of research studies which typify our attempts to
make sense of the rapidly expanding research literature. 1
Meta-analysis, then, is held up as a major new approach that can synthesize
large numbers of disparate studies. In this respect, it might be seen as a way
of breaking out of the "nothing works" debate. It is a step forward but not
the great leap forward that proponents claim.
Only a handful of relevant meta-analyses have been carried out so far.32
All (with one possible exception)33 conclude that rehabilitative treatment has
a positive affect upon recidivism. This is indisputably good news, but there are
several caveats that need to be taken into account.
head, 28 Criminology 419 (1990).
30. See Anthony Doob and Jean-Paul Brodeur, Rehabilitating the Debate on Reha-
bilitation, 31 Can J Criminology 179 (1989); Paul Gendreau, Programs That Do Not
Work: A Brief Comment on Brodeur and Doob, 31 Can J Criminol 193 (1989).
31. Gene V. Glass, Primary, Secondary, and Meta-Analysis of Research 5 Educ Res 3
(Nov 1976).
32. The major meta-analysis works include the following: Carol J. Garrett, Effects of
Residential Treatment on Adjudicated Delinquents: A Meta-Analysis, 22 J Res Crime &
Delinq 287 (1985); Rand Gottschalk, et al, Community-Based Interventions, in Herbert C.
Quay, ed, Handbook of Juvenile Delinquency 266 (John Wiley & Sons, 1987); Whitehead
and Lab, 26 J Res Crime & Delinq at 276 (cited in note 29); Don A. Andrews, et al,
Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed
Meta-Analysis, 28 Criminol 369 (1990); Mark W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment:
A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects, in Thomas D. Cook, et al, eds,
Meta-Analysis for Explanation 83 (Russell Sage, 1992).
33. Whitehead and Lab, 26 J Res Crime & Delinq at 291 (cited in note 29), conclud-
ed that "correctional treatment has little effect on recidivism." However, the authors did
not calculate an overall effect size. See Friedrich Losel, The Effectiveness of Treatment in
Institutional and Community Settings, 3 Crim Beh & Mental Health 416, 419 (1993),
which calculated the mean effect size for the Whitehead and Lab study and found it to
be positive.
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First, for all their seeming statistical sophistication, meta-analyses simply
gather a wide variety of very disparate studies and reduce the findings to a
fairly crude set of categories (most notably, in the case of recidivism, findings
are reduced to a simple "yes" or "no"). Given that primary studies often rely
on somewhat questionable methods, it is difficult to see how these problems
are somehow ironed out by further statistical manipulation. I have already
noted Maltz's point about the varying definitions of recidivism used by
researchers, 34 and I am not convinced that meta-analysis can make such
definitions consistent with each other.
Second, the meta-analyses conducted thus far have concentrated almost
exclusively on juvenile delinquents in the United States. It is assumed that if
treatment works for juveniles, it will work for adults-but this may be a naive
assumption. Adults are more likely to be married, have children, be unem-
ployed, or have drug or alcohol problems. In addition, it should be remem-
bered that the U.S. criminal justice system casts its net more widely than do
other systems (e.g., the U.K. system), so that on average the offenders included
in meta-analyses are not likely to be at a particularly high risk for recidivism.
Third, the meta-analyses continue to rely on primary studies conducted in
the 1950s and 1960s. This reliance on the past is not especially helpful. No
one would doubt that there have been many radical changes during the past
thirty or forty years in the kinds of offenses committed, levels of offending,
approaches to dealing with offenders, and the entire cultural context in which
offenders live their lives. Thus, to try to apply lessons that might have worked
in the past may not be a sensible approach.
Fourth, as soon as one begins to look in detail at a meta-analysis, prob-
lematic issues begin to emerge that could have a bearing on the studies'
findings and how they are interpreted. Take for example, Mark Lipsey's epic
study,35 partly because it is the most ambitious carried out so far, and partly
because Lipsey very clearly sets out the categories for the variables studied.
Lipsey cites 443 studies. For the primary delinquency measure (which is not
always recidivism) half of the follow-up studies have follow-up periods of less
than six months.36 Almost half of the studies were coded as having low
treatment integrity (43.8 percent), and approximately 75 percent were either
low or moderate on this rating (79.5 percent).37 Twenty percent of the studies
covered institutionalized juveniles and 50 percent covered non-juvenile justice
interventions.3 ' Almost two-thirds of the programmes were less than two
years old, which raises questions about the lasting impact of an initially
enthusiastic response to a program.39 Finally, one-quarter of the programmes
34. Maltz, Recidivism at 68-87 (cited in note 20).
35. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment at 83 (cited in note 32).
36. Id at 104 (29.6% of the primary studies had a follow-up period between fourteen
and twenty-six weeks and 13.5% had a follow-up period between one and thirteen weeks).
37. Id at 108.
38. Id at 109.
39. Id at 110.
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were administered by criminal justice personnel, one-quarter by mental health
personnel, and 20 percent by lay persons.4 °
Fifth, researchers using meta-analysis do not fully agree about its advantag-
es, and they themselves have identified several technical issues that need to be
addressed.4 Indeed, some have suggested a set of criteria for evaluating meta-
analysis.42
Finally, meta-analysis--despite the claims of many of those who use its
findings--can really only tell us that treatment in the general sense can have
a positive affect upon recidivism. It cannot tell us precisely what kind of
treatment should be used, when it should be used, in what doses, with what
offenders, or within what kind of programmes. Nor does it tell us about the
kinds of structures, the kinds of staff required, or the resources necessary to
deliver effective programs.
It is too easy to claim that meta-analyses demonstrate which principles
need to be followed to guarantee effective programmes-for example, targeting
high-risk offenders, ensuring high-treatment integrity, focusing upon crimino-
genic factors, or using structured programs appropriate to the abilities and
needs of offenders. Such claims have often been made in the U.K. during the
last two years. But it is important to emphasize that meta-analysis as presently
structured cannot offer such principles with any confidence (and, indeed, the
meta-analysts themselves tend to be cautious with their claims). The primary
sources rarely say anything detailed about the kinds of programmes studied,
how they were organised and delivered, whether they changed over time, and
so forth. And the reductive focus of meta-analysis, whereby aspects of studies
are coded down into a few crude categories, means that even if such details
were available, they would be categorised in such a way as to render them
unhelpful. 3
Most of the principles that are claimed to have emerged from meta-
analysis are, in fact, common-sense formulations that any rationally planned
programme should address-for example, targeting appropriate offenders, using
a multi-modal approach, focusing upon criminogenic needs, and basing the
programme upon sound theoretical foundations. Where meta-analysis can be
useful is in suggesting what appear to be the most promising ways to move
forward; it certainly does not offer cast-iron recipes for successful treatment
programmes. For example, Lipsey's work has been used in the U.K. to claim
that employment is the key to success in reducing re-offending among young
offenders, but careful scrutiny of his findings shows that only four studies fall
40. Id at 101.
41. See, for example, Gene V. Glass, Barry McGaw, and Mary Lee Smith, Meta-
Analyses in Social Research 217-31 (Sage, 1981); Robert Rosenthal, Meta-Analytic Pro-
cedures for Social Research 127-36 (Sage, 1991).
42. R. J. Bullock and Daniel J. Svyantek, Analyzing Meta-Analysis: Potential Problems,
an Unsuccessful Replication, and Evaluation Criteria, 70 J Applied Psych 108 (1985).
43. It is worth noting that coding in general is an absolutely critical factor in meta-
analysis that is usually ignored.
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into the category of juvenile justice programmes that focus upon employ-
ment.' This is not a very large number, and in any event there is no infor-
mation about how such knowledge might be operationalised.
Meta-analysis, then, is by no means the final word on the "nothing
works" discussion, but it does offer us a chance to break away from a sterile
and moribund debate. This is where evaluation may be helpful.
III. Evaluation
Perhaps the key reason for the longstanding debate over "what works" is
the lack of high-quality evaluation. The vast majority of studies that have
evaluated community penalties have been badly conceived, have been limited
in focus, have relied upon simplistic research designs, and have tended to make
claims that are not supported by the data. Indeed, there is considerable
confusion about what "evaluation" is and whether it differs from "research."
Every now and then, certain words and phrases acquire a power over and
above their normal everyday meaning. A few years ago, one such word in
criminology was the term "community." There was discussion of community
policing, community crime prevention, community probation, community
prisons, and so on.4 s It seemed that anyone who wanted to set up a new
initiative had only to use the word "community" to be noticed favourably. But
David Nelken noted a-fatal weakness behind this when he asked, "[i]f commu-
nity is the answer, what is the question!"" "Community" began to bear such
a weighty meaning that it ultimately became meaningless, simply a word to be
used to show that one understood the issues.
There are signs that the same process may be at work with the term
"evaluation." "Evaluation" is being used more and more by those who, only
a few years ago, would have used the term "research." Now, "evaluation" is
used as a synonym for "research" and as a key to unlock the doors to
funding. It is, however, essential to differentiate "research" from "evaluation"
no matter how much the processes may overlap in practice. There is no doubt
that research can be (and often is) evaluative and that an evaluation will
include (if not consist wholly of) research, but the differences between the two
processes should not be glossed over or ignored. I do not propose to offer any
definitive answer to the question of what is meant by "evaluation," but I do
offer some thoughts that should be addressed both by those who commission
44. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment at 124 (cited in note 32).
45. Paul Henderson and Sarah del Tufo, Community Work and the Probation Service
(HMSO, 1991); Tim Hope and M. Shaw, eds, Communities and Crime Reduction
(HMSO, 1988); David Brown and Susan Iles, Community Constables: A Study of a Polic-
ing Initiative (HMSO, 1985); Prison Service, Community Prisons: A Consultation Paper
(London, 1992).
46. David Nelken, Address to the Howard League Conference (1985), quoted in Cedric
Fullwood, Probation, Community and Inter-Agency Dimensions: A Future Look, in Robert
Shaw and Kevin Haines, The Criminal Justice System: A Central Role for the Probation
Service 119 (Inst of Criminology, Cambridge, 1989).
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evaluations and by those who carry them out.
"Evaluation" implies some assessment of success or failure, some kind of
measure of how well a programme or an initiative is working, and how much
of its aims and objectives are being achieved. Evaluation is carried out for
someone or some organisation and is connected with the policy process. 4
"Research," on the other hand, is more concerned with the establishment of
new facts. While it is connected to the scientific process of the acquisition of
knowledge, it is not necessarily linked to the policy process. Thus, "the
purpose of evaluation is to provide guidance to program staffs and policy
makers rather than to contribute to theory development. Accordingly, the
intent of evaluation studies is to document the utility and implementation of
purposeful actions rather than to temporarily find 'truth' by rejecting a null
hypothesis."48
Evaluation is, by its very nature, "political" in a way that research is not;
it is complex, problematic, and riddled with uncertainties.49 Various models
of evaluation can be found, but the two main types of interest here are
"process evaluation" and "outcome evaluation," or "impact evaluation."
Process evaluation concentrates on assessing how a project was put into
practice, what actually happened at the ground level of the project, what kind
of changes took place, and why they occurred. Outcome evaluation, on the
other hand, is concerned with the impact of the project-how far it moved to-
ward achieving what it set out to achieve, and whether there are any other
consequences. The point to emphasise is that both are necessary for a full
evaluation. Indeed, I would argue that a process evaluation is a prerequisite for
any outcome evaluation (and that a great deal can be learned from it in its
own right). Process evaluation provides the explanatory framework within
which outcomes can be interpreted; without a focus on process, outcome
measures are left in a vacuum and it becomes impossible to learn from success
or failure.
With respect to this Symposium, what kind of issues should we consider
to evaluate properly "viable alternatives to prison?" First, it is crucial to clarify
the meaning of "viable"; should we read it in a purely political sense, a
financial sense, an organisational sense, a structural sense, a humane sense, an
operational sense, in terms of public or judicial satisfaction, or in some
combination of these ways? To be slightly flippant, we know that alternatives
to prison are viable in the crudest sense of the word simply because so many
of them exist: the United States has spent vast sums of money devising and
47. This may happen at the macro- or micro-level, or it may be that the evaluation
is carried out for those who support or oppose the policy or strategy in question.
48. Leigh Burnstein and Howard E. Freeman, Perspectives on Data Collection in
Evaluations, in Leigh Burnstein, Howard E. Freeman, and Peter H. Rossi, Collecting
Evaluation Data 15, 16-17 (Sage, 1985).
49. Paul Ekblom, Evaluation: The Management of Uncertainty, Paper Presented to the
British Criminology Conference (1989) (on file with the University of Chicago Law School
Roundtable).
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researching alternatives to prison (or intermediate punishments) over the last
twenty years, and, as I noted at the outset, a great deal of English penal policy
since 1948 has been driven by the need to provide alternatives to prison. The
same can be said for many other European countries."0
In terms of evaluation, it is necessary to look at all the possible interpreta-
tions listed above, perhaps considering some to be more important than others,
as well as keeping an eye open for any unintended or unanticipated conse-
quences that have not been considered. This, of course, makes life much more
complicated, since it is unlikely that an alternative to prison would be equally
viable in all the senses listed. For example, an alternative to prison might be
effective in political and financial terms, although operationally (in terms of
actually diverting offenders from custody) it might be a failure. Indeed, success
measured by one criterion might even lead to perceived failure as measured by
another: research into probation centres in England and Wales suggested that
they were fairly successful as an alternative to a custodial sentence, although
a subsequent reconviction study showed very high levels of reconviction.5' By
focusing on offenders with a long criminal history and successfully selecting
them for a community penalty, probation officers were setting themselves up
for failure in terms of recidivism. Two measures of the effectiveness of proba-
tion centres (diversion from custody and recidivism), therefore, cut across each
other; success in one almost precludes success in the other.
No court sentence has but one objective: sentences aim to do a variety of
things-among them, reduce offending, retribute, repair, denunciate, and
generally deter In evaluating the effectiveness of sentences, therefore, to rely
upon one measure (such as recidivism) is, to say the least, misleading. A
variety of measures of effectiveness are required to evaluate a sentence. To go
down such a path raises almost as many issues as it resolves, and I will discuss
some of these issues later. First, however, I wish to provide an example of the
approach to evaluation that I have outlined here.
IV. Intensive Probation in England and Wales
The IP initiative that began in April 1990 may well have been the last in
a series of official "alternative to custody" initiatives. 2 These initiatives have
officially ceased since the introduction of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.
S0. See, for example, Norman Bishop, Non-Custodial Alternatives in Europe (Helsinki
Inst for Crime Prevention and Control, 1988).
51. George Mair and Claire Nee, Day Centre Reconviction Rates, 32 Brit J Crim-
inology 329 (Summer, 1992).
52. These are attendance centres, day centres, specified activities schemes, suspended
sentence, community service, and bail information schemes. See George Mair, Intensive
Probation in England and Wales: Origins and Outlook, Paper Presented at the British
Criminology Conference, Bristol (July 17-20, 1989); George Mair, Part Time Punishment
The Origins and Development of Serious Attendance Centres (HMSO, 1988); A. E.
Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in England, 1967-1978, 21 Brit J Criminology 1, 26
(1981); Charles Lloyd, Bail Information Systems: Practice and Effect (HMSO, 1992).
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Early in 1989, the Home Office invited ten probation areas to establish IP
programmes that would run for two years."3 This policy was motivated by a
variety of factors: prison overcrowding, financial constraints, a perceived need
for effective punishment, the need to regain the confidence of sentencers, the
success of efforts to reduce juvenile involvement in court proceedings, and the
U.S. example of intensive probation sentencing. This is not unusual, since so-
cial policy in general is driven by many disparate factors, and penal policy is
no different in this respect. 4 Perhaps more important, however, is the point
that IP was thereby expected to satisfy-implicitly if not explicitly-very
different demands. If IP would have proven able to reduce offending, reduce
the prison population, provide effective punishment, keep sentencers satisfied,
and reduce costs all at the same time, the Holy Grail would indeed have been
found.
IP was intended as an experimental, developmental initiative, and as a
result, there were few guidelines about what it should look like and how it
should be put into practice. It was intended to target high risk offenders,
seventeen to twenty-five years old, who were likely to receive a prison sen-
tence." IP schemes were expected to be rigorous and demanding-they have
to include strict referral and selection procedures, comprehensive individualised
programmes worked out with the offender and approved by the court, fre-
quent contact with probation officers, a focus on confronting offending
behavior, a multi-agency approach, and services for ethnic minority and female
offenders. 6
These guidelines left considerable discretion to the initiative and imagina-
tion of probation officers so that they could establish innovative projects. But
even before IP officially began, problems emerged. Only seven of the ten areas
participated fully. One did not wish to get involved, 7 one failed to develop
an IP programme during the course of the twenty-four-month experiment, s"
and one ran for less than twelve months." Even among those that did take
part, there was evidence that they feared Home Office disapproval if their
programmes were unsuccessful. 0 Not all IP schemes were at the same level
of development-some were underway before the official start date, some were
planning to implement IP programmes before the official start date, and others
were waiting for the official start to begin the process.6 1 Innovative IP pro-
jects were rare-probation officers did not seem to have the space, time, or
enthusiasm to grasp the opportunity offered them, and local politics and
53. Mair, et al, Intensive Probation Evaluation at ix (cited in note 3).
54. Mair, Origins and Outlook (cited in note 52).
55. Mair, et al, Intensive Probation Evaluation at ix (cited in note 3).
56. Id at ix-x.
57. Id at 7.
58. Id at 20.
59. Id at 9, 18.
60. Id at 9.
61. Id.
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bureaucratic procedures also proved to be obstacles to success.
Given the nature of the IP initiative, a simple evaluation design focusing
solely upon recidivism would have been singularly inappropriate. The study
was built around the need for both a process and an outcome evaluation. The
process evaluation was vital not only because of the importance of providing
a context within which outcome measures could be interpreted, but also
because of the experimental nature of IF. It would have been unfair to
condemn IP as a failure without trying to discern the reasons for failure, and
such data could only be supplied by a process evaluation. For the process
evaluation, three IP programmes were chosen for detailed study; they were not
intended to be representative of IP but rather were chosen on the basis of their
different approaches. 2
For the outcome evaluation, various measures of effectiveness were devised.
The primary measures were: (1) reconviction rates,63 (2) diversion from
custody, (3) the financial costs of IP, (4) the views of sentencers, and (5) the
views of offenders. 4 The outcome evaluation also used secondary measures
to cover factors that were specific to individual IP schemes or to the
individualised plans put together for offenders. These included help with
accommodation, employment, drug misuse, relationships, and use of leisure
time.
The research was carried out from 1990 to 1992, and a full report on the
results of the evaluation was published recently. In the following subsection, I
will briefly discuss some of these results, and I will then examine some issues
relating to the central policy development of IP and its implementation.
A. THE RESULTS OF IP
During the twenty-four months of the experiment, 1,677 offenders were
referred for intensive probation. 65 The majority were male (95 percent),66 and
more than three-quarters were between seventeen and twenty-five years old. 7
Around 6 percent were members of ethnic minority groups, 6 and 83 percent of
referrals were unemployed.69 On the whole, I1 schemes were successful in
catering to.ethnic minority offenders (although at least one area had no ethnic
minority referrals), 7 but almost half of the female offenders came from only
62. Id at 8.
63. Reconviction rates were measured during the course of the IP project as well as
during the subsequent period of supervision, including the time until reconviction, the
reconviction offence, and the sentence.
64. Mair, et al, Intensive Probation Evaluation at 9 (cited in note 3).
65. Id at 11.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id at 12.
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one IP scheme, which had set up special programmes for female offenders.7 '
The most common offence was burglary (42 percent of the cases studied),"
with theft (16 percent) and violent offenses (14 percent) also being fairly com-
mon.73 Only 6 percent were first offenders,74 while 51 percent had six or more
previous convictions.7" Fifty-four percent had served a previous custodial sen-
tence,76 and almost two-thirds were sentenced at the Crown Court.77 These
figures suggest that IP was successful at targeting offenders who had a high risk
of serving a custodial sentence, but they hide wide variations among the areas,
as table 1 shows.
Table 1
Characteristics of Referrals to Intensive Probation Schemes by Area
IP Area
Durham
Leeds
West Midlands
Berkshire
Gwent
Hampshire
Manchester
Northumbria
Total
Total
Number of
Offenders
95
532
187
94
186
351
17
215
1,677
Was Sentenced
at Crown
Male Court
(%) (%)
50
73
47
60
55
85
35
39
64
Has Six or
More Previous
Convictions
61
50
29
35
68
63
59
43
51
Had Previous
Custodial
Sentence
67
58
41
32
68
62
65
38
54
It is clear from the table that some areas were much more successful at
targeting high-risk offenders than others; Hampshire, Gwent, Leeds, and Durham
were markedly better in this regard than the West Midlands, Berkshire, and
Northumbria." The reasons for such differences lie in the design and objectives
of the schemes. Some focused on the Crown Court while others did not;" some
aimed for seventeen- to twenty-year-olds only, while others did not;8" some
simply re-designated an existing facility as an IP scheme;"' one designed and set
up a voluntary programme.82
71. Id at 19-20.
72. Id at 11.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Manchester has been ignored because it only had seventeen offenders.
79. Mair, et al, Intensive Probation Evaluation at 23 (cited in note 3).
80. See, for example, id at 12-20.
81. Id.
82. Id at 19.
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Sentencer satisfaction with IP was high." But widely varying views of IP
were put forward, not all of which could be easily reconciled: sentencers saw IP
as an alternative to custody as well as expecting it to reduce re-offending; 4 they
did not agree about the position of IP among the sentencing options available to
the courts;"5 and they often mentioned relatively minor offences as being suit-
able for IP.16 In general, sentencers saw the advantages of IP as either system-
oriented (i.e., leading to a reduction in the numbers being sentenced to custody)
or welfare-oriented (i.e., rehabilitative)." They rarely made any mention of
punitive aspects of IP.88 By far, sentencers saw the major potential drawback of
IP as the possibility that offenders-or the general public-might see it as a
"soft" option."
Probation officers who worked on IP schemes were enthusiastic about them
(with the exception of those in the West Midlands, one case study area), and
they considered themselves to be doing positive work with high-risk offenders."
Non-IP staff were not quite so enthusiastic, although their reactions were
dependent upon the length of time the program had been in effect and the degree
of consultation that had taken place in the local probation service. Negative
comments centered on the elitist nature of IP, the claim that more resources had
been made available to IP when the same ends could have been carried out by
ordinary probation orders, and the use of voluntary organisations where staff
were regarded as unqualified.9 In addition, questions about the enforcement of
orders were raised.92 It was notable that there were few direct criticisms of IP
as overly controlling.
Offenders who participated in IP schemes viewed the programmes positive-
ly.93 Probation officers who had opposed IP expected offenders to rebel against
the rigorous requirements expected of them, but, if anything, they appeared to
enjoy and appreciate the attention that was given to them by their project
workers.94 For the first time they felt that someone was taking a real interest in
them and what they did. This was reflected in the remarkably positive comments
made about their project workers, who were, for the most part, untrained
probation officers."5 Unfortunately, because of the dominance of the project
workers in their lives, the offenders perceived the role of probation officer as less
83. Magistrates in the case study areas were asked to complete a mailed questionnaire,
and a few judges were interviewed personally. Id at 118.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id at 118-19.
93. Id at 119.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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helpful.96
As required by the guidelines, all IP schemes used voluntary organisations to
assist in running the IP programmes to a greater or lesser extent, but there was
considerable uneasiness among probation officers about utilizing such
organisations (and such uneasiness seemed on occasion to result in anxieties
among workers in voluntary organisations about their role in IP).97 Whether or
not there was suspicion about the motives of voluntary organisations was dic-
tated by the history of working with these groups: if this had been a feature of
probation for some time in a given IP area, there was less unhappiness, but if it
was a new development, suspicions were aroused (with consequent repercussions
for referrals to voluntary organizations). Unfortunately, suspicions were fuelled
by the publication of a government discussion paper in April 1990. 9' This
paper, which coincided nicely with the beginning of the IP initiative, was widely
perceived as a move by the government to take certain tasks away from the
probation service and move them to voluntary organisations. 9  IP demonstrated
that partnership schemes with voluntary bodies could work, although tension
between the two has not yet completely disappeared.
While it should be clear that the IP initiative arose in a political context, it
is important to discuss this further. Over the last ten years, government policy
with regard to probation has focused on efforts to make it tougher and more
accountable,' 0 and IP was intended to be another step in this process. From
this perspective, IP's symbolic function cannot be discounted: it was planned to
provide rigorous and demanding punishment of offenders in the community. The
probation services involved responded accordingly. However, it should be noted
that in practice IP was rarely about controlling offenders. A great deal of social
work was carried out under the aegis of IP, and even where control/surveillance
was considerable, offenders were not unhappy about the demands made of them.
The politics of IP, therefore, are not clear. For some probation officers, IP was
a sensible approach for dealing with serious offenders in the community who
might have received a custodial sentence in the community. For others, it was a
further betrayal of traditional social work values and another nail in the coffin
of social work with offenders. All had to make some kind of accommodation to
IP, and in this sense its contribution to culture change in probation should not
be underestimated.
B. POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
The results of IP were not simply outcomes of the individual schemes; they
were also a result of the way in which IP was developed as a policy, the way that
96. It is possible that this may have an affect on post-IP supervision. See id.
97. Id.
98. Home Office, Partnership in Dealing with Offenders in the Community 119
(HMSO, 1990).
99. Id.
100. Id at 121.
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policy was transmitted to the probation service generally and to practitioners,
and the approaches taken at the local level to put IP into practice. These issues
are all too often assumed to be unproblematic and unrelated to the outcomes of
policy initiatives. In fact, they can have a critical impact upon the success or
failure of policies.
With regard to the development of IP at the central government level, there
were several relatively minor, though not insignificant, matters that suggest that
IP was not developed as well as it might have been. In the first place, the IP
initiative was initially incorporated in another development, the "Tackling
Offending" initiative.01 This led to a good deal of confusion among probation
services about how IP differed from Tackling Offending-was it a separate
development or a refinement? The confusion was compounded by the fact that
the government introduced the IP initiative only six months after the Tackling
Offending initiative was proposed. If areas had been approached at the same
time or twelve months later, initial responses might have been more welcoming.
IP areas were even more confused by an announcement soon after IP had
formally begun that a new community penalty was to be introduced in October
1992 (the "combination order"); the relationship between IP and the new order
was never satisfactorily explained.
There were also several assumptions that appeared to be embedded in IP
policy and that were not borne out in practice. Having a formal start date for IP
was a bureaucratic nicety but relatively meaningless; those areas that began IP on
the formal start date had been running a scheme (under another name) for some
time-and the length of time for which schemes had been running was an
important factor in their success. 2 The government all too easily assumed that
all of the probation areas approached were functioning at the same level of
development and were willing and able to respond equally effectively to the IP
initiative. In practice, some areas took a considerable amount of time to set up
an IP scheme, and this again had consequences for success.
Home Office guidelines regarding the form of IP were vague, which had the
advantage of allowing areas the discretion to develop their own ideas but also
the drawback of uncertainty about the precise goals of IP. Some IP schemes had
initially been responses to the Tackling Offending initiative and had simply
changed names."'3 As officials struggled to define IP in their own minds, one
area was included, then excluded, and finally included again in the IP initia-
tive.'O' Plans to develop an additional ten IP schemes twelve months after the
first group had begun to operate simply crumbled.-' There was little evidence
of innovative and imaginative IP schemes, perhaps because of fear of failure,
cynicism, lack of time, or lack of imagination. The most innovative scheme was
101. Home Office, Tackling Offending: An Action Plan (HMSO, 1988).
102. Home Office, Partnership in Dealing with Offenders at 121 (cited in note 94).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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a voluntary one that departed from Home Office guidelines." 6
The issue of clarity versus ambiguity in policymaking has no easy answers;
it is difficult to strike the right balance between stating policy in general-and
inevitably ambiguous-terms and in issuing clear and specific but often in-
appropriate and rigid, instructions. At the very least, it would be helpful for the
government to be clear about where ambiguity exists and why it is utilised. If
one desires to encourage experimental initiatives, then ambiguity and vagueness
are helpful, though again it should be noted that there may be a price to pay in
terms of trying to evaluate such initiatives. Setting the criteria for success may
not be easy in such cases.
V. "Crawling from the Wreckage": Concluding Thoughts
What has the evaluation of the IP initiative taught us about using this
approach to evaluate the impact of community penalties? First, although the
Home Office collected a great deal of data, not all of it points to a uniform
conclusion. On the whole, IP appears to have been successful, bearing in mind
that success is a matter of degree and not an all-or-nothing judgment."0 Not
only did IP target high-risk offenders, but sentencers thought it was useful, and
offenders appreciated it. Reconviction data are not yet available, but work has
begun on a reconviction study that should be completed before the end of the
year.
IP was not equally successful in all areas-it worked better in some proba-
tion areas than in others, and it worked better in some manifestations than in
others.' The research demonstrated that the process by which policy is de-
veloped centrally, transmitted to probation managers, and then translated into
practice is considerably significant not only in its own right but in terms of its
impact upon the workings-and thus the outcomes-of IP. It has helped to ad-
dress the point made some years ago by Alan Harland and Philip Harris" 9
about the lack of process studies in criminal justice research and how this
cripples new developments." 0 It also confirms the findings of Michael
Musheno and his colleagues' about the importance of organisational condi-
tions as a prerequisite to successful policy. Without a focus on process evalua-
tion, many of the important conclusions and insights from this analysis would
have remained hidden.
The study was not as successful in collecting data on the costs of IP or at
106. Id.
107. Dennis J. Palumbo, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Paula Wright, Measuring Degrees
of Successful Implementation, 8 Evaluation Rev 45, 47 (1984).
108. Mair, et al, Intensive Probation Evaluation at 124 (cited in note 3).
109. Alan T. Harland and Philip W. Harris, Structuring the Development of Alternatives
to Incarceration, in Stephen D. Gottfredson and Sean McConville, eds, America's Correc-
tional Crisis: Prison Populations and Public Policy 179 (Greenwood, 1987).
110. Id at 180-81.
111. Michael C. Musheno, et al, Community Corrections as an Organizational Innova-
tion: What Works and Why 26 J Res Crime & Delinq 136 (1989).
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utilising secondary measures of outcome. Few probation areas are able to assess
the costs of specific parts of their work, although implementation of a Resource
Management Information System may change this. But even if IP were several
times more expensive than ordinary probation, it would still be less costly than
custody in a straightforward comparison.112 Our plans to collect information
about the extent to which IP successfully tackled problems faced by offenders
(such as accommodation, employment, and drug or alcohol misuse) were
hindered by the relative inaccessibility of such information. There is no doubt
that probation officers collect and hold such information in the course of their
work, but it is kept in files as part of manual case notes; considerable resources
would have been required to collect such information solely for research purpos-
es. Again, this situation should change in the future. An ambitious Case Record
Management System is under development, and a research project that will test
various approaches toward a Problem Assessment Scale is about to commence
and become available for probation officers to use.
On a more general level, it is possible to summarize some pointers for setting
up alternatives to prison which are related to the approach to evaluation that has
been outlined in this Article."'
First, careful analysis of the perceived problem is vital, and planning should
be based upon this assessment as much as possible. The situation may be
temporary; it may be a result of remands to custody rather than sentencing; it
may be because of the numbers of criminals sentenced to custody; it may be that
sentencing lengths were increased; or, it may be that new sentences were over-
using custody. Thus, different approaches may be required in each of these
situations, and none of them may necessitate a new or revamped community
penalty. For example, if the goal is to reduce the prison population, there are
other ways to do so without new non-custodial sentences. Therefore we should
not necessarily concentrate our attention on this solution."4
Second, the new penalty should have clear achievable objectives that can be
prioritised. One of the curses of alternatives to custody has been the stream of
researchers who have argued that alternatives only serve to complement prison
sentences rather than substitute for them."' Maeve McMahon has demonstrat-
ed that some of the studies most frequently cited as providing evidence of net-
widening were methodologically flawedi and she has cautioned against the
112. Sophisticated analyses of sentences on a cost-effectiveness basis are rare, but excep-
tions have been found. See, for example, Martin Knapp, Eileen Robertson, and Gill
McIvor, The Comparative Costs of Community Service and Custody in Scotland, 31 How
J Crim Just 8 (1992).
113. Of course, the most thorough evaluation must consider other factors not within the
scope of this Article (e.g., adequate funding, the need to mobilize agency support, and the
recognition that programs have a shelf life and are not immutable).
114. David Smith, et al, Reducing the Prison Population: An Exploratory Study in
Hampshire (HMSO, 1984).
115. See Maeve McMahon, "Net-Widening": Vagaries in the Use of a Concept, 30 Brit
J Criminology 121 (1990).
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negativity and pessimism which can ensue if these conclusions are accepted at
face value." 6
Third, there should be a structured and coherent approach to implementa-
tion at all levels. The implementation process is usually taken for granted when
a new initiative is established; there is a naive assumption that what has been
planned on paper will be easily put into practice. This is rarely the case. In the
first place, there is often a long, hierarchical chain of individuals who have to
implement the programme. The greater the number of steps to be climbed before
the programme can be put into practice, the greater the chance that changes will
take place. This may be due to misunderstanding, reinterpretation due to local
circumstances, or opposition.
Fourth, the initiative should include a basic monitoring system. Monitoring
involves the collection of simple, basic information that should help to identify
the existence of a problem. While monitoring is unlikely to identify the precise
nature of the problem, that is not its objective. Those overseeing the programme
should agree on a monitoring system, and that system should be relevant-and
be perceived by others as relevant-to their work. It should be regularly analyzed
and interpreted and, whenever necessary, its findings should be promptly acted
upon. Of course, monitoring has its limitations, and we need to be clear about
these. It should not be confused with research or evaluation. Rather, it should be
treated as an integral part of a new initiative. It can play a vital role as an early
warning system.
Fifth, a full, independent evaluation should be planned from the beginning,
although outcomes from the first twelve months should be treated with caution.
Such an evaluation is time-consuming and resource-intensive; it can affect the
programme under study and can be difficult to interpret; it may make life more,
rather than less, complicated for policymakers, as it is unlikely to provide simple
answers. But it much more accurately reflects the complex nature of the phenom-
enon being evaluated. It should also offer some understanding of the mechanisms
that produced outcomes (which allows for more effective replication of the
program, or at least a better chance to learn from failure).
As I wrote this Article, two quotations kept running through my mind. One
was from Hegel: "[W]hat experience and history teach is this-that nations and
governments have never learned anything from history, or acted upon any
lessons they might have drawn from it."" 7 The other was from George
Santayana, who said, "[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.""' 8 The history of alternatives to custody is largely one of re-inven-
tion of the wheel; the time to move on is long overdue, and one way to do so is
to pay more attention to the role of evaluation.
116. Id at 132.
117. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History 21
(H. B. Nisbet trans, Cambridge, 1975).
118. George Santayana, The Life of Reason 284 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905).
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